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Abstract: Corporate firms access multiple sources of debt simultaneously. This study 
analyses the impact of debt diversification on firm value. We argue that, 
when firms diversify their debt sources, the monitoring role played by debt 
holders decreases as a result of the free rider problem. Hence, such firms 
should experience a value discount in the capital markets. Our empirical 
analysis provides evidence for the existence of a value discount in the 
capital markets for firms accessing multiple sources of debt. Our results 
remain robust for alternative measures of debt diversification. 
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1.  Introduction 
Rauh and Sufi (2010) and Colla et al. (2013) document the existence of debt 
diversification, i.e., accessing multiple sources of debt, among US corporate firms, as a 
common occurrence. Johnson (1997) reports that about 73% of US firms use more than 
one source of debt for a given level of debt. Surprisingly, despite the wide prevalence, 
the phenomenon of debt diversification is yet to be thoroughly examined. One such 
pertinent area is the impact of debt diversification on firm value. Managers of a firm are 
expected to take decisions that increase shareholders’ wealth. This then leads us to the 
question whether the managerial decision to go for multiple sources of debt is a value-
adding decision or not. In other words, do firms with diversified sources of debt 
command a better value in the capital markets?  
The theoretical rationale for a relationship between debt diversification and firm value 
can be traced to Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who argue the 
existence of credit rationing in the financial markets. Credit rationing limits the ability of 
firms to raise the required amount of debt from a single source or lender which in turn 
could potentially restrict managers from undertaking worthwhile projects. In such 
settings, debt diversification becomes an optimal strategy that managers can 
implement to overcome the constraints levied by credit rationing. This facilitating nature 
of the debt diversification decision, therefore, suggests a positive association between 
debt diversification and firm value.  This positive association finds further theoretical 
ground through Harris and Raviv (1990) and Rajan (1992) who argue that debt plays an 
essential disciplining role by reducing the agency costs of equity. In the presence of 
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moral hazard problems, debt holders typically tend to monitor the activities of the firm1 
and thereby, help alleviate the agency costs thereof. One would then expect this 
monitoring mechanism to be relatively more intense for a firm with multiple debt holders 
(i.e., greater debt diversification) relative to a firm with fewer debt holders.  
Consequently, a firm with greater debt diversification should experience lower agency 
costs and greater firm value, i.e., a positive association between debt diversification 
and firm value. This argument, however, finds a counter-hypothesis through findings in 
several studies (Krugman,1988; Carletti et al., 2007; Brunner and Krahnen, 2008) which 
argue the presence of multiple debt sources may lead to a drop in the efficiency of 
monitoring, due to the free rider problem and the lesser incentives for an individual debt 
holder to monitor the activities of the borrowing entity2. Carletti et al. (2007) in fact, 
propose a model in which the efficiency of monitoring is highest in the case of a single 
debt holder with substantial lending to the firm. This premise suggests a negative 
association between debt diversification and firm value. The objective of our paper is 
to therefore, examine whether debt diversification increases (via the financial 
constraints and the agency costs hypotheses) or erodes (via the free rider hypothesis) 
the value of the firm.  
We employ Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value. Debt diversification is proxied using 
two measures. The first proxy is the total number of sources from which a firm has 
accessed debt (i.e., has an outstanding balance at the financial year-end). Since this 
measure does not account for the dispersion of debt within these sources, we use the 
normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as our second proxy of debt 
diversification. Our results using both measures support the free rider hypothesis – firms 
with diversified debt sources experience a value discount in the capital market. We 
further check the robustness of our results by splitting our sample firms into small and 
large groups based on the annual median sales. The negative association is observed 
for all firms irrespective of their size for both measurements of debt diversification.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: data and methodological aspects are 
described in the second section, results are presented and discussed in the third section, 
and conclusions are presented in the last section. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
2.1 Data 
 
Our sample period spans from 1962 to 2015, and the financial data for our analysis has 
been obtained from COMPUSTAT. We exclude financial, regulated and zero debt firms 
from our analysis 3 . The summary statistics for the variables used in our study are 
presented in Table 1. Our final sample consists of 149,938 firm-year observations.  
 
As indicated by our first proxy for debt diversification, Debt Number, the average 
number of debt sources for our sample firms is about 2.6 with a median of 2.  Since our 
sample comprises non-zero debt firms only, the minimum and the maximum debt 
                                                     
1 This monitoring activity is aided by their access to private information of the firms, especially for banks. Bond 
holders on the other hand, typically form trusts to oversee the activities of the firm. 
2 Lender’s rent is divided among many debt holders. 
3 We winsorized the data at 5% to limit the spurious effect of outlier and further restricted values of Tobin’s Q, 
Tangibility, R&D ratio and DPR to non-negative values. Values of ROA less than negative one and of lagged 
leverage greater than one have also been dropped.   
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number are one and eight respectively. HHI which adjusts for the dispersion aspect of 
debt diversification is spread between a minimum and maximum of 0 and 0.957 
respectively. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value to the book value of the firm’s total assets. Debt Number is the total 
number of debt sources that a firm has used. HHI is the dispersion-adjusted measure of debt diversification. Firm 
Size is log of firm sales. ROA is the return on total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net investments in plant and 
machinery to total assets. Asset growth rate is the change in total assets over lagged total assets. R&D Ratio is 
the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets. DPR is the ratio of total dividends to total 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The values are rounded up to the nearest decimal. 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tobin's Q 149,938 1.468 1.281 0.442 6.170 
Debt number 149,938 2.564 1.332 1.000 8.000 
HHI  149,938 0.365 0.277 0.000 0.957 
Firm Size 149,938 4.775 2.287 -0.038 8.689 
Asset growth rate 149,938 0.142 0.324 -0.329 1.116 
ROA 149,938 0.017 0.209 -0.779 0.231 
Tangibility 149,938 0.302 0.207 0.026 0.762 
R&D ratio 149,938 0.030 0.057 0.000 0.231 
DPR 149,938 0.009 0.014 0.000 0.047 
Leveraget-1 149,938 0.293 0.209 0.015 0.895 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
To estimate the marginal impact of debt diversification on firm value, we use Eq. (1) as 
our baseline model. 
 
Yit = αi + β1 Debt Diversificationit + β2 Firm Sizeit + β3 ROAit + β4 Tangibilityit + β5 Asset growth rateit + 
β6 R&D ratioit +   β7 DPRit + + β8 Leverageit-1 + εit 
(1) 
 
Where, Yit,  the dependent variable, is the Tobin’s Q calculated as the ratio of the 
market value to the book value of a firm’s total assets. Of the two measures of debt 
diversification used, the first is Debt Number, which is the number of debt sources that 
a firm has accessed. We consider eight mutually exclusive debt sources in our study. 
They are: capitalized lease obligations (dclo); senior convertible debt (dcvsr); 
subordinated convertible debt (dcvsub); debt debentures (dd), debt notes (dn); 
subordinated debt (ds); notes payables (np) and other long-term debt (dlto)4. 
 
Our second measure of debt diversification is the HH index that accounts for dispersion 
of debt between the debt sources by assigning a higher weight to those sources with a 
higher proportion in the overall debt. This measure is computed using the same eight 
                                                     
4 The variable codes used in the Compustat database are provided in parentheses. 
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sources of debt thus: we measure the concentration of debt, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
scores, by summing the squared ratios of individual debt to total debt.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ � 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆�28𝑖𝑖=1    
                         (2) 
The value obtained in (2) is then normalized using Eq. (3) to arrive at the normalized HH 
index. 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻it = 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻it−(1/8)
1−(1/8)           
              (3) 
Greater HHI values indicate lesser debt diversification. The HHI variable, therefore, bears 
a negative correlation with debt diversification and with Debt Number. We subtract HHI 
(obtained in Eq.3) from one to make its interpretation consistent with that of Debt Number 
and use this modified proxy for the rest of the paper. 
The control variables used in this study are:  Firm Size is log of firm sales, ROA is return on 
total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net investments in plant and machinery to total 
assets, Asset growth rate is the change in total assets over lagged total assets, R&D ratio 
is the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets, DPR is the ratio of 
total dividends to total assets, and Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. We 
use a one-year lagged value of Leverage to avert issues from a possible 
contemporaneous relationship between a firm’s leverage and its debt number. 
We use fixed effects estimator5 to estimate the coefficients of our model presented in Eq. 
(1). This technique helps to control for unobserved time-invariant variables that might 
impact firm value proxied by Tobin’s Q. The year-effects on firm value are controlled by 
using year dummies. We also use firm fixed effects to account for unobserved firm-level 
factors.  
 
3. Results and discussion 
The impact of debt diversification on firm value is examined by regressing Tobin’s Q on 
our measure of debt diversification. The financial constraints and the agency costs 
hypotheses predict a positive association while the free rider hypothesis predicts a 
negative association. The results of the analysis using Debt Number are presented in Table 
2.  
The coefficient for Debt Number for the full sample analysis, presented in Model I, is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% significance level in support of the free rider 
hypothesis. This result is consistent with Carletti et al. (2007) who examined the impact of 
multiple banking relationships6 on the value of Danish firms. To check the robustness of 
this negative association, we classify our sample firms into small and large firms based on 
the yearly median value of firm size (captured by the log of firm sales). Firms with below 
(above)-median firm size are classified as small (large) firms. We re-estimate Eq. (1) for 
these sub-samples separately.  As presented in Model II and Model III, the coefficients of 
Debt Number for both small and large firms respectively are negative and significant. The 
                                                     
5 Our data rejected the null of Hausman test at 1% confidence level. 
6 Their study is concerned with multiple banking relationships whereas our study is concerned with multiple 
sources of debt. 
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results, shown in Table 3, based on the normalized HHI as the measure of debt 
diversification, support the findings in Table 2, based on Debt Number.  Overall, the 
analyses offer substantial evidence that firms which use diversified debt sources 
experience a value discount in capital markets. 
 
Table 2: Regression analysis using Debt Number 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value to the book value of the firm’s total assets. The 
main independent variable is Debt Number, which is the total number of debt sources that a firm has used. The 
control variables are defined as: Firm Size is log of firm sales, ROA is the return on total assets, Tangibility is the 
ratio of net investments in plant and machinery to total assets, Asset growth rate is the change in total assets 
over lagged total assets, R&D Ratio is the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets, DPR 
is the ratio of total dividends to total assets, and Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The coefficients 
are estimated using fixed effects estimator, and heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors, clustered at the 
firm level, are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  Full Sample Small Firms Large Firms 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III 
Debt number -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Firm Size -0.183*** -0.233*** -0.135*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
ROA 0.066 -0.511*** 3.140*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.104) 
Tangibility -0.131** -0.239*** 0.110* 
 (0.051) (0.067) (0.064) 
Asset growth rate 0.586*** 0.602*** 0.350*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) 
R&D ratio 3.467*** 2.991*** 2.601*** 
 (0.231) (0.250) (0.485) 
DPR 7.704*** 3.439*** 7.153*** 
 (0.528) (0.741) (0.625) 
Leveraget-1 0.494*** 0.668*** 0.141*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.040) 
Constant 1.929*** 2.075*** 1.493*** 
 (0.049) (0.098) (0.074) 
Observations 149,938 74,959 74,959 
R-squared 0.136 0.150 0.245 
Number of firms 15,780 12,593 6,524 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3: Regression analysis using HHI 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value to the book value of the firm’s total assets. The 
main independent variable is HHI which is the dispersion-adjusted measure of debt diversification. The control 
variables are: Firm Size is log of firm sales, ROA is the return on total assets, Tangibility is the ratio of net investments 
in plant and machinery to total assets, Asset growth rate is the change in total assets over lagged total assets, 
R&D Ratio is the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets, DPR is the ratio of total dividends 
to total assets, and Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The coefficients are estimated using fixed 
effects estimator, and heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  Full Sample Small Firms Large Firms 
VARIABLES Model I Model II Model III 
HHI -0.179*** -0.182*** -0.133*** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.018) 
Firm Size -0.184*** -0.236*** -0.132*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
ROA 0.076 -0.499*** 3.141*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.104) 
Tangibility -0.132** -0.248*** 0.116* 
 (0.051) (0.067) (0.064) 
Asset growth rate 0.582*** 0.596*** 0.351*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) 
R&D ratio 3.476*** 2.996*** 2.614*** 
 (0.231) (0.250) (0.483) 
DPR 7.727*** 3.495*** 7.107*** 
 (0.528) (0.741) (0.625) 
Leveraget-1 0.492*** 0.664*** 0.148*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.040) 
Constant 1.893*** 2.028*** 1.452*** 
 (0.050) (0.098) (0.075) 
Observations 149,938 74,959 74,959 
R-squared 0.136 0.150 0.246 
Number of firms 15,780 12,593 6,524 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of debt diversification on firm value. Our results suggest 
there is a negative impact of debt diversification on firm value. Prior studies maintain 
that the presence of debt in the capital structure tends to decrease agency costs; 
however, our results reveal that having debt from multiple sources tends to reduce that 
advantage. Thus, managers using diversified debt sources in an attempt to overcome 
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financial constraints engendered by credit rationing might potentially erode 
shareholder wealth. 
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